Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266522 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
JRC Digital Economy Working Paper No. 2021-05
Publisher: 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Seville
Abstract: 
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing. We study the incentives of a data broker to sell data about a segment of the market to three competing firms. The segment only includes a share of the consumers in the market around one of the firms. Data are never sold exclusively. Despite the data are particularly tailored to the potential clientele of one of the firms, we show that the data broker has incentives to sell the list to its competitors. Such market outcome is not socially optimal, and a regulator that aims to maximise consumers and social welfare should consider mandating data sharing.
Subjects: 
data markets
personalised pricing
price discrimination
oligopoly
sellingmechanisms
JEL: 
D43
K21
L11
L13
L41
L86
M21
M31
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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