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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2555
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing relocation mobility of firms leads to increasing net tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. The resulting fall in the governments' subsidy payments over-compensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues. We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax competition
subsidy competition
capital and firm mobility
foreign direct investment
JEL: 
H71
H87
F21
H25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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