Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265961 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9926
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We construct a novel data set to show that, between 2003-2020, up to one-fifth of America's largest firms had a non-financial blockholder or insider as their largest shareholder. Blockholders and insiders tend to be less diversified than institutional investors. Measures of "universal" and "common" ownership of firms are therefore lower than previously believed based on analyses of institutional investors' holdings alone, and the heterogeneity in ownership structures across firms is greater. Consolidation in the asset management industry increases universal ownership and common ownership of industry rivals. Extant results claiming indexing alone explains the rise of universal ownership cannot be confirmed with the new, more comprehensive data.
Schlagwörter: 
common ownership
institutional ownership
blockholders
insiders
antitrust
governance
JEL: 
G23
G34
L21
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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