Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26314 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2269
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper addresses outsourcing in the two-type optimal income tax model. If the government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not affect the marginal income tax structure. In the absence of a direct tax instrument, and under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing increases the wage differential, the government will implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done.
Schlagwörter: 
outsourcing
optimal nonlinear taxation
JEL: 
H21
H25
J31
J62
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
112.1 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.