Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262725 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 29/2022
Publisher: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target firm prior to the deal announcement, enabling them to benefit from the positive announcement return. We do not find such effects for bank connections to acquirer advisors or for trades in acquirer stocks. Target advisors benefit from leaking information about takeover bids to connected banks, as it drives up the final offer price without compromising the probability of bid success.
Subjects: 
bank networks
trading
information spillovers
mergers and acquisitions
syndicated lending
JEL: 
G11
G15
G21
G24
ISBN: 
978-3-95729-900-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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