Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262092 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 148
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the approach by providing novel comparative statics results in different applications.
Subjects: 
Strategic Communication
Small Bias
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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