Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260874 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9744
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects compete with different types of opponents in the second round (random/based on first-round outcome). We find that (i) losing causes competitors to increase cheating in the second round while winning implies a tendency to reduce cheating. A similar effect is found with regard to effort, which losers increase to a larger extent than winners. (ii) Competitor matching does not significantly affect behavior.
Subjects: 
cheating
effort
competition
competitor
social recognition
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
M52
J28
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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