Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260309 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2020:17
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that if players are uncertain but can acquire information about a payoff-relevant state of the world, the number of equilibria depends on whether they can implement strategies (stochastic choice rules) discontinuous in the state. We experimentally test these results in a two-player investment game. Through a minimal visual variation in the design (our treatment) we prompt participants to play strategies whereby their probability to invest is either continuous or discontinuous in the payoff-relevant state. When participants use continuous strategies, average behavior is consistent with play in the risk-dominant equilibrium, the unique theoretical prediction. When they use discontinuous strategies—in¬¬ which case there are multiple equilibria—average behavior is closer to the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we extend the theory to heterogeneous populations: the set of equilibria monotonically decreases in the proportion of players who use continuous strategies.
Subjects: 
Coordination
Global games
Information acquisition
Continuous stochastic choice
Visual information
Experiment
Perception
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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