Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260156 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2015:18
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains "almost all" preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
Subjects: 
Rationing Price Equilibrium
(Extended) English Price Sequences
Iterative English Auction Rule
JEL: 
C78
D44
D45
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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