Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260113 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2014:16
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
Subjects: 
Ultimatum
Yes/No game
JEL: 
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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