Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260086 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013:30
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
We study risk taking on behalf of others, both with and without potential losses. A large-scale incentivized experiment is conducted with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when losses are excluded. In contrast, when losses are possible, decisions on behalf of others are more risky. Using structural estimation, we show that this increase in risk stems from a decrease in loss aversion when others are affected by their choices.
Schlagwörter: 
Risk taking
loss aversion
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D81
G02
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.25 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.