Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260061 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2013:3
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to offer a comprehensive overview of non-reciprocal trade preferences. Legal and economic aspects are discussed, and in particular, focus is put on how the specific design of preference programs influence whether or not preferences will have their intended effects. The paper starts by summarizing the historical and legal background of non-reciprocal trade preferences, and thereafter discusses how preferences are intended to work from an economic point of view. Further, the paper discusses ways to determine whether or not preferences meet their intended targets, and outlines in some detail how preference programs differ in their design. The question of how trade preferences could have negative effects for recipient and non-recipient countries is explored, and the paper concludes by discussing whether trade preferences will be a useful policy alternative in the future.
Subjects: 
Unilateral trade preferences
non-reciprocal trade agreements
GSP
JEL: 
F13
F15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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