Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259866 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2002:17
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.
Subjects: 
Strategy-proof
Indivisible object
Housing market
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
177.01 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.