Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259340 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2003-08
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
A group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes into account the different individual competences, and is therefore not anonymous. Under such a rule, it is rational for group members to vote informatively, i.e., according to their private information. The use of any (non-trivial) anonymous voting rule may provide an incentive for some group members to vote strategically, non-informatively. However, this paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous voting rule does not depend on whether or not they actually choose to do so; a single, second best, rule maximizes utility in both cases.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic voting
informative voting
committees
imperfect information
JEL: 
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
325.15 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.