Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257806 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Financial Studies [ISSN:] 2227-7072 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 61 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-20
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This study investigates the level, structure, and pay-for-performance relationship of CEO compensation in Korean non-life insurance companies. We find that seniority plays an important role in setting CEO compensation practices and that performance-based pay, such as bonus, is more effective than base salary in enhancing shareholder value for Korean non-life insurers. Unlike previous studies that show that international differences in executive pay have been diminished considerably since the 2000s, our evidence shows that there is a remarkable difference in CEO compensation between Korean non-life insurers and U.S. property-liability insurers. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the pay-performance relationship is weaker in Korean non-life insurance companies relative to US counterparts, suggesting that it is necessary for Korean non-life insurers to tie performance-based compensation more closely to shareholder value in the design of CEO compensation.
Subjects: 
CEO compensation
pay-performance sensitivity
property-liability insurers
JEL: 
G22
G39
J33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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