Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257731 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Financial Studies [ISSN:] 2227-7072 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 64 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives' incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A.With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors.
Subjects: 
mergers and acquisitions behaviors
executive compensation incentive
beneficial distribution mechanisms
listed companies
JEL: 
G34
M52
N25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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