Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257535 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 53 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-29
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent's group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information's cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group's favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups' sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.
Subjects: 
conventions
coordination
costly information acquisition
evolution
stochastic stability
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Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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