Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257518 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 36 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-11
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different payoffs. Results show that such ascending bid auctions may result in unfair treatment and additionally that uncertainty regarding an ad's value can result in inefficiency. An alternative way to assign ads to consumers is presented called the random assignment mechanism. Results show that the random assignment can improve fairness while improving efficiency in some circumstances.
Subjects: 
auctions
efficiency
fairness
online advertising
JEL: 
D44
L86
M3
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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