Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257515 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 33 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.
Subjects: 
aggregate matching
lattice
median stable matching
rationalizability
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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