Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257479 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 61 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-27
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent's group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members' contributions with an endogenous mechanism.
Subjects: 
cooperation
experiment
group membership
public good game
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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