Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256791 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 324
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.
Subjects: 
Collective branding
reputation
free-riding
repeated games
imperfect monitoring
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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