Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25607
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ellingsen, Tore | en |
dc.contributor.author | Miettinen, Topi | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-27T09:21:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-27T09:21:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25607 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy equilibria, one party gets all the surplus. Even though we impose no constraints on side-payments, efficient compromises are unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conflict. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,037 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Authority | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Commitment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Disagreement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Transaction Costs | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Transaktionskosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Disagreement and authority | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 547124554 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.