Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253659 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Embedding consumer experimentation with a product or service into a market environment, we find that unregulated contracts induce too few returns or cancella tions, as they do not internalize a pecuniary externality on other firms in the market. Forcing firms to let consumers learn longer by imposing a commonly observed statutory minimum cancellation or refund period is socially efficient only when firms appropriate much of the market surplus, while it backfires otherwise. Interestingly, cancellation rights are a poor predictor of competition, as in the unregulated out come firms grant particularly generous rights when competition is neither too low nor too high.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.