Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253657 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze firms' competition to steer an advisor's recommendations through potentially non-linear incentives. Even when firms are symmetric, so that the overall size of compensation would not distort advice when incentives were linear, advice is biased when firms are allowed to make compensation nonlinear, which they optimally do. Policies that target an advisor's liability are largely ineffective, as firms react to such increased liability by making incentives even steeper, increasing bonus payments while reducing the linear (commission) part at the same time. This observation may justify policymakers' direct interference with firms' compensation practice, as frequently observed notably in consumer finance.
JEL: 
L51
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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