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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9574
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the question whether a holder of standard essential patents (SEPs) should be allowed to choose the level in the value chain at which to offer a FRAND license to its SEPs. We give a pos-itive answer to this question for two reasons. First, the SEP holder and the social planner tend to choose the licensing level that, other things being equal, minimizes transaction costs. Second, the SEP holder maximizes total output, which is often aligned with social welfare maximization by the planner. These two factors make it likely that the SEP holder chooses the efficient level of SET licensing.
Schlagwörter: 
standard-essential patents
SEP licensing
FRAND
telecommunications
royalty base
licensing level
alignment of incentives
JEL: 
K21
L40
O34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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