Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249723 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Texto para discussão No. 675
Verlag: 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro
Zusammenfassung: 
In product markets, there exists substantial dispersion in prices for transactions of physically identical goods, and incumbent sellers sell at higher prices than entrants. This study develops a theory of dynamic pricing that explains these facts as results from the same fundamental friction: Buyers are imperfectly aware of which sellers are operating, and the degree of awareness about a seller is ndogenous. The equilibrium is unique and efficient, and features randomized pricing strategies where incumbents post higher prices than entrants. If buyers' memory depreciation is low, then the equilibrium of the industry tends to approximate perfectly competitive conditions over time.
Schlagwörter: 
Buyer Awareness
Price Dispersion
Customer Capital
Industry Life Cycle
Information Frictions
JEL: 
C78
D11
D40
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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