Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247704 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-095
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.
Schlagwörter: 
Childcare assignment
deferred acceptance algorithm
JEL: 
C78
D02
D47
D82
I24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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