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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 2106
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a consequence, the Shapley value belongs to the core, which enhances the attractive features of our new centrality measure. Then, we compute the Shapley value for various examples and illustrate some of its properties.
Schlagwörter: 
Social networks
network games
peer effects
centrality measures
Bonacich centrality
Shapley value
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
D85
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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