Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245981 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2021/18
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
An anonymous social choice function for a large atomless population maps cross-section distributions of preferences into outcomes. Because any one individual is too insignificant to affect these distributions, every anonymous social choice function is individually strategy- proof. However, not every anonymous social choice function is group strategy-proof. If the set of outcomes is linearly ordered and participants have single-peaked preferences, an anonymous social choice function is group strategy-proof if and only if it can be implemented by a mechanism involving binary votes between neighbouring outcomes with nondecreasing thresholds for "moving higher up". Such a mechanism can be interpreted as a version of Moulin's (1980) generalized median-voter mechanism for a large population.
Subjects: 
Social choice
large populations
strategy proofness
group strategy proofness
single-peaked preferences
JEL: 
D60
D70
D82
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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