Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243057 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2020-03
Verlag: 
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE), Quezon City
Zusammenfassung: 
Are new mayors more responsive to disasters than their reelected counterparts? The identification strategy is based on slim vote margin in which new and reelected mayors are found to be as if randomly assigned. We find that with greater storm exposure: new mayors spend more on health sector than reelected mayors. We don't find stable and statistically significant result in other sectors and in total municipal income or expenditure
Schlagwörter: 
election
accountability
disaster response
JEL: 
D72
D73
H84
O17
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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