Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242909 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IFS Working Paper No. W21/10
Publisher: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Abstract: 
This paper studies regulatory policy interventions aimed at protecting sticky consumers who are exposed to exploitation. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established firms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under which such interventions can be counterproductive, both with regard to the stated consumer protection objective and the complementary aim to promote competition.
Subjects: 
switching costs
price discrimination
uniform pricing
most-favoured customer clauses
price regulation
competition
JEL: 
L11
L13
D4
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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