Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242447 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering. When preferences are compatible, however, players coordinate on a refined equilibrium set. How easily the requirements for preference compatibility are met crucially depends on a property of the network structure: neighborhood nestedness. This means that equilibrium selection succeeds in small, connected structures but also in centralized networks. All predictions are confirmed in an experiment.
Subjects: 
social preferences
network games
equilibrium selection
JEL: 
D85
C70
C91
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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