Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241841 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 295-314
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
Using the unique scheduled disclosure system for annual reports in China's stock market, we examine within-industry herding behavior in annual report timing. The results reveal the waiting and following behavior strategies used in the annual reporting process within industry. Firms that originally schedule an early (late) disclosure date within their industry are more likely to reschedule to a later (earlier) date. Informational pressure is the dominant mechanism underlying herding in annual reporting, and capital market reputation incentives mainly induce the herding of bad news. Further analysis shows that delaying disclosure via the waiting strategy reduces the future occurrence of restatements, whereas bringing forward disclosure does not change the propensity of future restatements. Overall, we enrich the limited empirical studies on sequential mandatory disclosure decisions within industry.
Subjects: 
Financial disclosure
Annual report
Disclosure timing
Herding behavior
Informational pressure
Scheduled disclosure system
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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