Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24104 
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dc.contributor.authorRincke, Johannesen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:48:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:48:51Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24104-
dc.description.abstractA simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented.Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an oldand a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to theold policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governmentsare either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. Anequilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad governments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evaluation. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstickcompetition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should show spatial correlation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwYardstick Competitionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.titleYardstick Competition and Policy Innovation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn479723583en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:2901en

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