Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240931 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] The RAND Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1756-2171 [Volume:] 52 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 314-333
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underprovided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users may obtain positive rents—users may prefer facing a manipulative provider.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.