Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240773 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 2578
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
This study investigates the relationship between electoral donations made by industrial entrepreneurs and the behavior of federal deputies elected for the 54th legislature (2011-2015), with regard to the presentation of legislative proposals favorable or contrary to the interests of that business sector. The effect of campaign financing is controlled by the effect of a number of other variables potentially relevant to the phenomenon of interest. The results show that industrial electoral contributions favor the presentation of bills that converge with the interests of the donors, but do not prevent the presentation of other bills rejected by that economic sector.
Subjects: 
campaign financing
legislative behavior
Chamber of Deputies
JEL: 
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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