Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240509 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1366
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
Economic theory predicts that outsourcing public services to private firms will reduce costs, but the effect on quality is ambiguous. We explore quality differences between publicly and privately owned ambulances in a setting where patients are as good as randomly assigned to ambulances of different ownership statuses. We find that privately owned ambulances are better at responding to contracted quality measures but perform worse on noncontracted measures, such as mortality. In fact, a randomly allocated patient has a significantly higher risk of death if a private ambulance is dispatched. We also present suggestive evidence on the mechanism, supporting that private firms cost innovate at the expense of ambulance staff quality.
Subjects: 
R&D
Innovation
Trade policy
Productivity
JEL: 
F13
L60
L13
O30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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