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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 8 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-18
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We address the paradox that financial innovations aimed at risk-sharing appear to have made the world riskier. Financial innovations facilitate hedging idiosyncratic risks among agents; however, aggregate risks can be hedged only with liquid assets. When risk-sharing is primitive, agents self-hedge and hold more liquid assets; this buffers aggregate risks, resulting in few correlated failures compared to when there is greater risk sharing. We apply this insight to build a model of a clearinghouse to show that as risk-sharing improves, aggregate liquidity falls but correlated failures rise. Public liquidity injections, for example, in the form of a lender-of-last-resort can reduce this systemic risk ex post, but induce lower ex-ante levels of private liquidity, which can in turn aggravate welfare costs from such injections.
Schlagwörter: 
banking
clearinghouses
systemic risk
JEL: 
G21
G22
G31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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