Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237503 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-01227
Publisher: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Abstract: 
This paper uses a model of intergenerational accounting to simulate the intergenerational distribution of oil wealth in Venezuela. Venezuelan oil production does not seem to follow an optimal extraction path. Nevertheless, this is true if we do not consider what the government does with the resources received from the oil sector. In this paper we explored the interaction of oil policy and fiscal policy using an intergeneration accounting model. We found that these interactions could explain certain outcomes. In particular, the model could explain why the sector was open for investment in 1991 and then 're-nationalized' in 2001. Results suggest that when fiscal policy could leave an important burden to future generations, voters seem to favor a more tax oriented oil policy, leaving the oil in the subsoil.
Subjects: 
Oil policy
Fiscal policy
Intergenerational accounting
Fiscal voracity
Oil expropriation cycles
Venezuela
JEL: 
E21
E22
E24
E32
E62
E65
H13
H21
H50
L71
N16
N56
O13
P16
Q38
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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