Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237333 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 088
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
I analyze the assignment mechanisms used by the political parties in the US Senate to match their members to legislative committees from a matching theory perspective: one-sided, many-to-many matching with existing tenants. Understanding the data-generating process through detailed analysis of committee assignment procedures is crucial, but under-appreciated in the literature. I find that Republicans and Democrats use two distinct matching mechanisms creating very different strategic incentives, and analyze the theoretical and empirical implications of these organizational procedures. First, foundational theories of committee assignments must be re-evaluated in light of the constraints and induced strategic considerations of the two mechanisms. Second, my findings inform how to parse data for well-grounded empirical analysis by exploiting marked differences in strategyproofness which these mechanisms induce, both across parties and across seniorities within party. Lastly, I derive testable predictions from matching theory and present suggestive empirical tests highlighting the strategic intricacies of the assignment process.
Subjects: 
matching
legislative organization
committee
strategy proofness
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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