Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/236633 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-057
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Temporary agency work and outsourcing to a service contractor are two forms of alternative work arrangements with rather complex legal aspects which firms use for external staffing. The regulatory complexity of temporary agency work can lead to intended or unintended non-compliance when firms outsource to a service contractor. In this paper, I provide first evidence for non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations when firms contract out on the basis of a unique new firm survey. By exploiting a choice experiment, I demonstrate that firms do understand the regulatory baseline of temporary agency work, although detailed knowledge often seems to be missing. Non-compliance with regulations therefore often results from ignorance of the legal grayzone.
Schlagwörter: 
temporary agency work
contracting out
compliance
choice experiment
JEL: 
K31
J41
J83
M55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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