Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235285 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8915
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
Subjects: 
merger remedies
merger control
antitrust
JEL: 
L13
L40
K21
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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