Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233327 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 112
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze personalized regulation in the form of sin licenses to correct the distortion in the consumption of a harmful good when consumers suffer from varying degrees of self-control problems. We take into account preference uncertainty, which generates a trade-off between flexibility and commitment provided by sin licenses. We also account for the possibility that consumers may trade the sin good in a secondary market, which partially erodes the commitment power of sin licenses. We show that if sophisticated consumers are allowed to choose any general, individualized pricing scheme for sin goods, they will choose a system of sin licenses. Nevertheless, sin licenses do not implement the social optimum in our general setting. We derive a simple criterion for assessing whether switching to a system of sin licenses improves welfare over linear sin taxes.
Schlagwörter: 
self-control problems
sin licenses
non-linear pricing
demand uncertainty
secondary markets
JEL: 
H21
H30
I18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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