Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233260 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 44
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We study auction design when parties cannot commit to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game any number of times and the buyers may choose their outside option at any stage of the game. A dynamic consistency condition and an optimality condition property are defined to characterize the seller's mechanism selection behavior. The unique stationary mechanism selection rule that meets the conditions is the English auction.
Subjects: 
auctions
commitment
consistency
one-deviation property
stationarity
JEL: 
C72
D44
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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