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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14125
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Using administrative data from a major Chinese insurance firm that raised its sales targets and rewards for insurance agents in a highly non-linear incentive system, we find that the improvement in productivity far outweighed the costs associated with bunching distortions and other gaming behaviors. Labor turnover decreased, which suggests that the extra pay for workers exceeded the non-pecuniary cost of extra effort by workers, and thus improved their well-being. The firm gained about two-thirds of the higher net output, making the reform profitable. Analysis of non-linear incentive systems should accordingly focus more on the productivity-enhancing than on the distortionary effects.
Schlagwörter: 
non-linear incentives
insurance commission
strategic gaming behavior
productivity
turnover rates
JEL: 
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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