Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232778 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14026
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In the German unemployment insurance system, Integration Agreements (IA) are mandatory contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, jointly signed by the latter and the caseworker. IAs stipulate rights and obligations but are generally perceived as instruments to control search behavior. We designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial involving thousands of newly unemployed workers, where we randomize the timing of the IA as well as the extent to which this timing is announced prior to the meeting. Randomization is at the individual level. We use administrative registers to observe outcomes. A theoretical analysis of anticipation of prior announcements provides suggestions to empirically detect this. The results show that IAs early in the spell have on average a small positive effect on entering employment within a year. When classifying individuals using an employability indicator, we find that this result is driven by individuals with adverse prospects. Among them, being assigned to an early IA increases the probability of re-employment within a year from 45% to 53%.
Subjects: 
unemployment
monitoring
job search
active labor market policy
nudge
anticipation
randomized controlled trial
JEL: 
J68
J64
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
851.29 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.