Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232485 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8888
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects are consistent with producerprotecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.
Subjects: 
protectionism
World Trade Organization
regulation
non-tariff barriers
public safety
environmental protection
JEL: 
F13
F14
L15
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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