Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230518 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Comparative Economic Studies [ISSN:] 1478-3320 [Volume:] 63 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Palgrave Macmillan [Place:] London [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-30
Publisher: 
Palgrave Macmillan, London
Abstract: 
This paper explores whether redistributive politics can explain differences in agricultural subsidies in Russia, a country whose autocratic regime represents a fertile ground for strategic redistribution. Relying on political economy literature, we examine the strategies regional and federal Russian politicians utilize to allocate and distribute agricultural subsidies. Using unique 2008–2015 panel data, we test whether politicians target loyal or easily swayed voters and whether they use large farms as vote brokers. We find federal and regional politicians to allocate more agricultural subsidies when political competition against the dominant party is higher. Moreover, they appear to also target large farms for voter mobilization.
Subjects: 
agricultural subsidies
redistribution
political competition
vote brokers
Russia
JEL: 
D72
H77
H23
P16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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