Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230404 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2017/16
Publisher: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Abstract: 
We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period.We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long.
Subjects: 
Repeated Implementation
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Overlapping Generations
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
JEL: 
C72
C73
D71
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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