Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229961 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik No. 21/1
Verlag: 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik und Ordnungsökonomik, Freiburg i. Br.
Zusammenfassung: 
The link between federalism and economic performance is still ambiguous. Aiming at clarification, we improve on a widespread shortcoming by measuring federalism not just by one variable but by various institutions that constitute it. To this end, Switzerland provides for a laboratory as its 26 cantons share a common framework, while the extent of federalism varies between the cantons and across time. By exploiting this setting, a two-way fixed-effects approach provides evidence for the expected heterogeneity: The impact of federalism on economic performance differs conditional on the federal instrument considered. Overall, instruments of competitive federalism appear to improve economic performance of the cantons, while for cooperative elements the effects are not unambiguously identified.
Schlagwörter: 
Fiscal Federalism
Economic Growth
Fiscal Competition
Fiscal Equalization
JEL: 
H77
H73
O43
O47
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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